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Dual Regulation, Collaborative Management, or Layered
Federalism: Can Cooperative Federalism Models from Other
Laws Save our Public Lands?
Hope M. Babcock*
Few would assert that the current governance model for managing the
nation's public lands,' which grants exclusive authority to the federal
government, has protected the natural resource values of those lands or
provided a framework for the harmonious resolution of conflicts over their
use.2 Dissatisfaction is apparent from recurrent proposals to privatize public
lands3 or to develop their ownership to the states.4 The emergence of the
* Professor Babcock is an Associate Professor of Law at Georgetown University
Law Center. This article is an outgrowth of the author's presentation at the Natural
Resources Law Center of the University of Colorado School of Law conference,
Challenging Federal Ownership and Management: Public Lands and Public Benefits
(Oct. 11-13, 1995), and on testimony she gave before the U.S. Senate Energy and
Natural Resources Subcommittee on Forests and Public Lands Management, on
November 2, 1995. The author would like to thank Peter Byrne, Vicki Jackson, Richard
Lazarus, and Doug parker for their insightful comments on earlier drafts of this
article, and Barbara Rich, the author's research assistant, for her invaluable
assistance and attention to detail in preparing this article for publication.
1. The meaning of the term "public lands" has varied greatly. While the term is
most frequently used to mean all land owned by the United States, at various points
in time, the phrase has been synonymous with the term "public domain lands," the
provenance and meaning of which is also a matter of some confusion and ambiguity.
This article uses the terms public lands and public domain lands interchangeably to
refer only to the lands managed by the Bureau of Land Management (BLM). See
George C. Coggins, PUBLIC NATIONAL RESOURCEs LAW § 1.102111 (1990) for further
explication of the meaning of these and other comparable terms.
2. The Western historian Patricia Limerick refers to this conflict as an
"infinitely sustainable boxing match." Patricia Limerick, A History of the Public Lands
Debate, Natural Resources Law Center of the University of Colorado School of Law
conference, Challenging Federal Ownership and Management: Public Lands and
Public Benefits (Oct. 11-13, 1995) (paper in the possession of the author.).
3. James L. Huffman, Public Lands Management in an Age of Deregulation and
Privatization, 10 PUB. LAND. L. REV. 29 (1989) (urging abandonment of presumption
favoring public management in favor of examination of institutional alternatives,
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"wise use" and "county supremacy" movements directly challenges the
authority of the federal government to manage its land.5 While this new
state and local assertiveness is not without historical basis nor completely
without merit,' its proponents have yet to offer a workable solution other
than complete ouster of the federal sovereign!
Emerging theorems in conservation biology and ecology which are
changing our view of the natural landscape are placing additional strains on
the current model. What once was a highly localized decision about how a
specific piece of land within a fixed geo-political boundary should be
managed, has gained regional (even global) implications.8 Ecologists are
convincingly demonstrating that effective natural resources management
implicates more than one governing authority in the management task,
requiring consultation and coordination among political jurisdictions. 9
such as private control). But see Joseph L. Sax, The Legitimacy of Collective Values in the
Case of Public Lands, 56 U. COLO. L. REV. 537 (1985) (preferring collective values to
atomistic individual ones).
4. For a comment highly critical of delegating to states a role in managing
national natural resources such as Yellowstone National Park, see Richard
Schneebeck, Comment, State Participation in Federal Policy Making for the Yellowstone
Ecosystem: A Meaningful Solution or Business as Usual?, 21 LAND & WATER L. REv. 397 (1986)
(explaining that serious deficiencies in state legislation, limited state jurisdiction
and national interests require retained federal control).
5. The wise use and county supremacy movements are well-organized efforts
in the West opposing increased environmental protection on federal lands and the
acquisition by the federal government of more public lands for preservation
purposes. See Anita P. Miller, All is Not Quiet on the Western Front: The Battle for Public
Lands, 25 URB. LAw. 827 (1993) (describing and analyzing legal basis of wise use,
county supremacy movements); Rene Erm I1, The 'Wise Use' Movement: The
Constitutionality of Local Action on Federal Lands Under the Preemption Doctrine, 30 IDAHO L.
REV. 631 (1993-94) (concluding that county land use plans requiring federal agencies
to include county governments in their management and planning processes are a
valid constitutional response to preservationist policies).
6. Sally K. Fairfax, et al., Federation and the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act: Now You See It,
Now You Don't, 59 WASH. L. REV. 417 (1984); Richard H. Cowart & Sally K. Fairfax, Public
Lands Federalism: judicial Theory and Administrative Reality, 15 ECOLOGY L.Q. 375 (1988).
7. Cf. Bernard Shanks, THIS LAND IS YOUR LAND (1984) (arguing for retention of
federal ownership).
8. Judy L. Meyer, The Dance of Nature: New Concepts in Ecology, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
875 (1994).
9. Robert B. Keiter, NEPA and the Emerging Concept of Ecosystem Management on the
Public Lands, 25 LAND & WATER L. REV. 43 (1990); Reed F. Noss, Some Principles of
Conservation Biology, as They Apply to Environmental Law, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 893, 907
(1994) (explaining that ecosystem management requires cooperation among
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Ecologists and conservation biologists are also teaching us that chaos
and diversity are more appropriate biological goals than equilibrium and
single specie restoration. ° The contemporary ecological paradigm
recognizes that natural systems are open and not necessarily in equilibrium
and that the focus of the paradigm should be on process or the "trajectory of
change, rather than on the final endpoint." If, as conservation biologists
contend, a landscape is composed over time, then decisions about the
management of these systems must include the capacity to adapt to new
information and unanticipated systemic changes.2
To realize the goals of conservation biology and ecosystem
management, the institutions that govern these systems must be able to
work together harmoniously, across political boundary lines and into a
biologically uncertain future.' 3 The rigidity of the current public lands model
creates substantial barriers to the achievement of these goals. 4
The era of special interest dominance of public lands policy may be
over as well. To cattle and timber barons and hard rock miners who have
ruled the public lands under a battery of nineteenth-century laws and
agencies and landowners and coordination of inventory, research, monitoring, and
management activities).
10. Fred P. Bosselman & A. Dan Tarlock, The Influence of Ecological Science on
American Law: An Introduction, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 847, 869-71 (1994) (stating that
resource management has become a grand and "risky" experiment, in which human
change is viewed as just one more "flux").
11. Meyer, supra note 8, at 877.
12. Meyer, supra note 8, at 881-82. See also Professor William Rodgers who
contends that conservation biology has undermined the present legal
superstructure, because that structure is based on a preference for static legal
conservation techniques like acquisition of fee simple absolute title to land, removal
of resident human populations from condemned lands, parcel-by-parcel evaluations,
and what he labels an "ark" configuration (management of species by isolation within
impermeable boundaries). William H. Rodgers, Jr. Adaptation of Environmental Law to the
Ecologists' Discovery of Disequilibria, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 875, 887 (1994).
13. The need to create institutional and process harmony in the management
of these natural systems is illustrated by the rapid development of private and state-
owned lands surrounding our national parks. This development is decreasing the
cushioning effect those lands once had for the public resources, eroding the federal
land manager's ability to protect the federal portion of transboundary ecosystems.
Robert B. Keiter, Taking Account of the Ecosystem on the Public Domain. Law and Ecology in
the Greater Yellowstone Region, 60 U. CoLo. L. REV. 923 (1989).
14. Joseph L. Sax. Nature and Habitat Conservation and Protection in the United States,
20 ECOLOGY L.Q. 47 (1993) (criticizing what he labels the historic "enclave strategy" approach to
public lands management).
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policies, Charles Wilkinson's "lords of yesterday,"5 are giving way to multiple
public lands "communities" 16 The West is now a variegated landscape of
diverse communities loosely bound together in a patchwork of shared
interests, occupations, and geographic locations, not by a single philosophy
of commodity extraction. 7 Governance institutions and procedures designed
to accommodate bipolar conflicts among powerful special interests over the
consumption of natural resources are ill-suited for conflicts in this new
polycentric world. 8
This article's working premise is that unless the current governance
structure for the management of public lands changes, the political conflicts
over their use and management will continue to blight their future, just as it
has marred their past.' 9 Further, failing to adapt the management of public
lands to our changing perceptions about the nature and needs of the
biological and social communities that depend upon them will only
engender a new generation of conflicts and further diminish the vitality of
15. Charles F. Wilkinson, CROSSING THE NEXT MERIDIAN: LAND, WATER, AND THE
FUTURE OF THE WEST 17 (1992).
16. Sarah F. Bates, Public Lands Communities: In Search of a Community of Values, 14
Pub. Land. L. Rev. 81 (1993). For an even earlier exposition of the ideas contained in
Bates' article, see Joseph L. Sax, Do Communities Have Rights? The National Parks as a
Laboratory of New Ideas, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 499 (1984).
17. For example, Raymond Rasker reports that the Rocky Mountain West has
added over 2 million new jobs from 1969 to 1991, most of which were in "service-
related" occupations. Again, according to Rasker, in 1969, over 11% of all direct
employment resource industries (mining, farming, ranching or lumber); by 1991,
these combined industries represented less than 6% of all employment and less than
5% of all personal income, while the service industries, in 1991, represented over 81%
of employment and 68% of labor income. Raymond Rasker, A New Look at Old Vistas:
The Economic Role of Environmental Quality in Western Pacific Lands, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 369,
377 (1994). See also SARAH F. BATES ET AL., SEARCHING OUT THE HEADWATERS: CHANGE AND
REDISCOVERY IN WESTERN WATER POLICY (1993); Cowart & Fairfax, supra note 6; Bates,
supra note 16. For an even earlier exposition of the ideas contained in Bates' article,
see Sax, supra note 16.
18. Conservation biology's "adaptive management" approach with its
emphasis on diversity and flux may offer a useful prism through which to view these
new public land communities as well.
19 The article assume that the present public lands management model is
too broken to be fixed with minor changes to existing public lands laws and
institutions, and that the current paradigm cannot be saved. Therefore, the models
discussed in this Article are presumed to be substitutes for, not amendments or
supplements to, that model.
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those communities." Nowhere are these conflicts more intense and the risks
and consequences of failure higher than on the "public domain" lands; those
lands managed by the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) under the
authority of the Federal Land Policy & Management Act (FLPMA).2
The purpose of this article is to determine whether there are
alternatives models of federalism, which might improve the management of
public domain lands.22 None of the models discussed here, however,
proposes complete rescission of federal authority over public lands; rather
they offer an enhanced role for states in the federal decision-making
process.23 A continuing federal presence is assumed to be necessary to
prevent inter-state distribution inequities from arising or economic
discrimination from occurring. Only the federal government can correct
market failures when they occur and uniformly protect national norms, such
as our natural heritage.24 And even if the Western states are becoming more
20. According to Rasker, community stability can best be assured by economic
diversity. Rasker, supra note 17, at 391. Rasker goes on to make the point that the
cornerstone of an economic diversity strategy is the creation of a favorable business
climate and the protection of the cultural, social, and environmental qualities that
make a community a pleasant place in which to live and do business. Id.
21. 43 U.S.C. § 1701-84 (1994).
22. This article looks at "federalism" as an organizing principle of American
government, as a theory of institutions, in which what is most important is the
allocation of power between federal and state governments. Phrases used in this
Article, like "federalism structure" or "federalism model" refer to the apportionment
of day-to-day management authority over public domain lands between the federal
and state governments. The focus of the Article is on the very practical problems that
that apportionment must solve. Less doctrinal and more theoretical questions about
"principled" notions of federalism, derived from the constitutional debates over our
federal structure of government or from more modern prudential concerns, and their
application to the allocation of power on the nation's public lands, while beyond the
scope of this Article, are currently under examination by the author. For a more in
depth exposition of this distinction, see H. Jefferson Powell, The Oldest Question of
Constitutional Law, 79 VA. L. REV. 633 (1993). For a closer look at the complexity of how
power is distributed between the political institutions of state and federal
governments in the latter part of the twentieth century, see Larry Kramer,
Understanding Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1485 (1994).
23. The Article does not address the question of who should own the public
lands. Therefore, issues of state or county devolution and privatization are not
discussed, nor is the validity of the normative goals set out in the public lands laws,
since none of the models requires their change.
24. Professor A. Dan Tarlock sets forth many of these rationales in his article.
A. Dan Tarlock, National Power, State Resource Sovereignty and Federalism in the 1980s: Scaling
America's Magic Mountain, 32 KAN. L. REV. 111, 121-22 (1983). A more refined look at the
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supportive of these norms as some assert," serious questions would remain
about the ability of those states to take on sole responsibility for
management of these lands without an infusion of new funds.26
question than is offered here might also examine the purpose for which the land is
being managed and the conflicts that might arise from that management, the
strength of the federal interest in the particular land or resource being managed, the
impact of the decision on local interests, the extent of parity between the competing
jurisdictional interests, and the irreversibility of the consequences.
25. Some find this a dubious assumption and question whether an enhanced
state role on public lands can be consistent with environmental protection. See, e.g.,
Schneebeck, supra note 4. But cf. Cowart & Fairfax, supra note 6; Jeffrey L. Beyle, A
Comparison of the Federal Consistency Doctrine Under FLPMA and the CZMA, 9 VA. ENVTL. L.J.
207, 217 (1989). The courts have found no such inconsistency, supporting what might
be called a "rejuvenated federalism" - an enhanced state role in the administration of
environmental programs, in general, and on public lands, in particular. John D.
Leshy, Granite Rock and the States' Influence Over Federal Land use, 18 ENVTL L. 99 (1987);
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992); California Coastal Comm'n v. Granite
Rock Co., 480 U.S. 572 (1987).
'A strong theoretical argument can also be made that states should play some
role in management of these lands. These arguments are based on the recognized
role states-play in our federal system of government. Core federalism values
commonly associated with the states include preservation of liberty, civic
participation and diversity. For further exposition of this thought and its
consequences, see The Federalist Nos. 10, 45 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961); Richard B. Stewart, Madison's Nightmare, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 335 (1990) (arguing
that the very factions Madison feared at the local level, necessitating a strong federal
sovereign, have taken over government at the national level); Powell, supra note 22, at
681-88. See also Ann Althouse, Variations on a Theory of Normative Federalism: A Supreme
Court Dialogue, 42 DUKE L.J. 979 (1993) (convergence on normative principle that
federalism is important because it protects rights of citizens).
One could also argue from the vantage of political expediency that maintaining
some measures of state control over management of these lands will enhance the
legitimacy of that management, and from the vantage of administrative efficiency
that the complexity of land use issues of this nature suggests that effective
regulation and enforcement should be grounded in knowledge of specific local
conditions. See James H. Wickersham, The Quiet Revolution Continues: The Emerging New
Model for State Growth Management Statutes, 18 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 489, 529-30 (1994)
(applying this reasoning to advocate on behalf of a consistency model for land use
planning under which local governments maintain a strong presence subject to state
oversight).
26. Cowart and Fairfax argue that growth in the states' capacity to manage
environmental resources is a critical component in the push to devise a new scheme
of public land management. Cowart & Fairfax, supra note 6.
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The article examines three models of governance ("dual regulation,"
"collaborative management" and "layered federalism") found in other areas
of environmental law to determine whether their application to public
domain lands might lessen the federalism tensions inherent in the current
model and enhance the land manager's ability to make decisions that are
both ecologically sound and reflect the new voices populating these lands.27
Achieving rational ecosystem management and a more democratic mode of
decision-making may be of greater importance than attaining non-fractious
governance. Intergovernmental friction may be a necessary, unavoidable,
even welcome byproduct of our "compound republic" form of government; a
transaction costs of a federal structure that relies on overlapping and
sometimes conflicting jurisdictions of governance to safeguard those
liberties not protected by the explicit constitutional guarantees." No soch
benefit accrues from the other two problems.29
27. There are models which change the basic constructional federalism design
(such as might be suggested by English land use law), create new governmental
entities (public corporations), or make use of interstate agreements (interstate
compacts), which might solve some or even all of the problems associated with
management of public domain lands. How far our institutions and systems of
governance should be restructured in the search for a solution to the public lands'
dilemma, however worthwhile an inquiry, is beyond the scope of this Article.
Therefore, while the models examined here each shifts the balance of power and
realigns the working relationships between the three levels of government, none
restructures that basic framework. The author also recognizes that any acceptable
substitute paradigm would, in addition, have to avoid unsettling long-held public
and private expectations, creating unnecessary costs, or fostering distributional
inequities. However, such an analysis of the extent to which each of the models
might avoid these impacts is also beyond the scope of this Article.
28. Dave Froynmayer, A New Look at Federalism: The Theory and Implications of Dual
Sovereignty, 12 ENVTL. L. 903, 912 (1982). Indeed, the Federalists envisioned that
friction between the central government and the several states might even come to a
show of force, which they countenanced because of the importance of the states in
protecting the rights of the people. See, e.g., The Federalist No. 26 (Alexander
Hamilton) (states are to "sound the alarm" if the conduct of the national rules
appeared improper and serve not only as the voice but the "Arm" of the people's
discontent), and The Federalist No. 46 (James Madison) (stating that opposed to the
United States would be "a militia amounting to near half a million citizens with arms
in their hands . . fighting for their common liberties and united and conducted by
governments possessing their affections and confidence"). The Federalist (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961) quoted in Kramer, supra note 22, at 1515-17.
29. This article does not disaggregate complaints about the management of
public lands that reflect only the self-interests of single user groups from those who
champion a broader public cause and maximization of the public's share of the
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The structure of the article is straightforward. Part II examines the
current federalism model on public domain lands and concludes, despite
some of its virtues, the model has caused inter-governmental friction and
created barriers to rational ecosystem management and community-based
participation in the decision-making process. Part III describes and then
critiques each of the alternative federalism designs against the same three
criteria. The article concludes by suggesting which, if any of the models
holds the greatest promise for resolving the problems besetting public lands
management. While the author recognizes that these problems may be too
complex, diverse and endogenous to the public lands experience or a
specific geographic area to enable a "single size fits all solution, she hopes
that the analytical exercise of examining these models may enrich the
storehouse of ideas we draw from in the search for solutions.
II. The Prevailing Federalism Or "Dominant Federal" Model
The current governance model on public domain lands grants the
federal government legal primacy or dominance over those lands.3" The
salient feature of the "dominant federal" model is that the federal
government administers resource management programs on public domain
lands by itself. There is no statutorily mandated management role for the
states!. BLM issues grazing permits, mining patents, oil, gas, coal, and
geothermal leases, and off-road vehicles permits,. not the state land
management agency. The state has no legal authority to manage the natural
resources that are the subject of these authorizations, even when their
management directly implicates the state's vital interests.3'
There have been experiments with more "cooperative" or reciprocal
models of federalism on public lands at various points in our history,32 but
distributional benefits from these lands. In the author's opinion, the former should
be entitled to little deference in any discussion about managing public resources,
and should not by themselves cause any changes in the present federalism model.
30. For greater information about the application of this precept to rangeland,
see George C. Coggins, The Law of Public Raingeland Management IV: FLPMA, PRIA, and the
Multiple Use Mandates, 14 ENVTL. L. 1 (1983).
31. The rigidity and absurdity of this arrangement is perhaps best illustrated
in the case of so-called "checkerboard lands," an eponymous pattern of Western
Land ownership reflective of the historic public lands disposition practices of the
nineteenth century, where each jurisdiction manages its squared subpart of the
renewable and nonrenewable resource in accordance with its management goals
and directives.
32. See, e.g., Brown Blair, Jr., The Columbia River Gorge National Scenic Area: The Act,
Its Genesis and Legislative History, 17 ENVTL. L. 863 (1987). Cowart & Fairfax, supra note 6,
at 421-39 (discussing a variety of administrative techniques that have been utilized
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none of these has significantly changed the balance of power between the
federal government and the states.33 Laws like the National Environmental
Policy Act3 4 and the Endangered Species Act35 require little more than
consultation with state agencies, giving the states no power over federal
agency decisions. FLPMA's "consistency" provisions" stop well short of
giving states and local communities a land use planning-based veto over
activities on public domain lands.3" On public domain lands, the federal
government is, as the model's title implies, "dominant."
by state, local and federal resource managers to manage public domain resources
cooperatively).
33. Cowart & Fairfax, supra note 6, at 408 (historical, physical and fiscal
realities have led federal and state governments to share de facto management of
public lands). For a more theoretical exposition of the same conclusion, see Kramer,
supra note 22 (political parties, structure of administrative state, exit rights, and
cultural commonalities link fortunes of federal and state office holders in a reciprocal
dependence requiring each to pay attention to needs of others).
34. 42 U.S.C. § 4321-70d (1994). See id. § 4332 (preparation of environmental
impact statements); Cowart & Fairfax, supra note 6, at 415 n.211 (discussing the
extent to which NEPA Guidelines have been incorporated in BLM planning
regulations).
35. 16 U.S.C. § 1531-44 (1994). See id. § 1536. See also id. § 1535 (state
cooperative agreements).
36. FLPMA § 202(c)(8) requires that the Secretary's land use plans shall
provide for compliance with federal and state pollution control laws. 43 U.S.C. §
1712(c)(8) 91994). FLPMA § 202(c)(9) imposes a consistency obligation on those
plans to "the maximum extent [the Secretary] finds consistent with Federal law and
the purposes of this Act." 43 U.S.C. § 1712(c)(9) (1994). These requirements have
been interpreted by BLM as requiring "consideration" of resource-related plans and
policies of state and local governments." 43 C.F.R. § 1610.3-2(e) (1995); Cowart &
Fairfax, supra note 6, at 417.
37. Leshy, supra note 25. Even Cowart and Fairfax, who cite the consistency
language in FLPMA as providing a statutory basis for more cooperative federal-state-
local management of public lands, admit that the importance of these provisions is
"probably more political and symbolic than legal," noting the language does not give
the states a veto over federal programs or initiatives and that the federal land
manager has ultimate authority to determine whether federal programs are
consistent with state and local priorities and even to over-ride those priorities to
achieve federal objectives. Cowart & Fairfax, supra note 6, at 418. See also Beyle, supra
note 25, at 220-21 (noting that under FLPMA's coordination mandate, "[tihere are no
structural guarantees that views of state and local governments or the public will be
taken into account" as the Act does not define what is meant by "meaningful public
participation").
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While the "dominant federal" model, with its unitary sovereign,
provides some assurances that national norms will be met and that
distributional inequities between regions will be minimized, the model has
caused problems for public lands governance. The model's dependence
upon centralized, coercive control over state action is responsible for much
of the tension and frustration fueling the "county supremacy" and "wise use"
movements.38 By offering only a single target for takeover, the model allowed
special interests to capture federal land management agencies 9 with
calamitous results for the natural resource base.' And, by largely excluding
states from the management exercise, the model has done little to
encourage states to develop their own natural resource management
capabilities, perpetuating the myth of state inability and unwillingness to
assume a more active management role over these resources.4
38. Miller, supra note 5; Anita P. Miller, The Western Front Revisited, 26 URB. LAW.
845 (1994). For an interesting perspective on the context and history of the
comparable, earlier Sagebrush Rebellion, see Cowart & Fairfax, supra note 6.
39. Wilkinson, supra note 15; Coggins, supra note 30.
40. While the condition of the BLM rangeland has improved, in 1991 35% was
still classified by the Council on Environmental Quality as poor or fair, compared to
82% in 1936. Council on Environmental Quality, Environmental Quality: The Twenty-
Third Annual Report of the Council on Environmental Quality, fig. 24b, at 346 (1992).
For an analysis of the impact of grazing on public lands, see Myles J. Watts & lefrey T.
LaFrance, Cows, Cowboys, and Controversy: The Grazing Fee Issue, in MULTIPLE CONFLICTS
OVER MULTIPLE USE, POLITICAL ECONOMY RESEARCH CENTER 59 (Terry L. Anderson ed.,
1994). See also Huffman, supra note 3, at 49, Wilkinson, supra note 15; Coggins, supra
note 30.
41. Fairfax, et al., assert that state environmental management capabilities (i.e.,
the political and legal authority authorizing states to administer natural resource
laws, the states' institutional capacity to implement these laws and the availability of
a relevant information-base) have improved as a result of experience administering
pollution control laws and interacting with federal government under multiple-use
statutes. Fairfax, et al., supra note 6. Others argue that the experience under the
multiple-use statutes has been too limited to give states comparable expertise in the
natural resource management area. Schneebeck, supra note 4 (state legislation rarely
addresses issues like establishing priorities between competing uses of natural
resources, is frequently fragmented between different state agencies and few, if any
mechanisms for requiring coordination between interested agencies exist at the
state level); Melinda Bruce & Teresa Rice, Controlling the Blue Rash: Issues and Trends in
the State Land Management, 29 LAND & WATER L. REV. 1 (1994) (modifications must be
made in existing state land use management practices for long-term sustainability of
the resources on those lands); C. Maison Heidelberg, Note, Closing the Book on School
Trust Lands, 45 VAND. L. REV. 1581 (1992) (modification of the framework governing
management of state school trust lands is warranted).
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The "dominant federal" model's dependence upon political boundary
lines and single-use designations42 defies well-accepted precepts of
conservation biology43 and biodiversity protection," as well as notions of
"sustainability."45 The model rests upon the notion that species can be
protected in perpetuity through management in isolated preserves, even
though the preserve's boundaries are permeable, its conditions and
residents always in flux. 6 The model's reliance upon a commodity stability
strategy, which emphasizes commodity extraction as the sole interest of
public lands communities, conflicts with and threatens the emerging
amenity-based foundation of the new western economy.47 Regional
42. Public lands law virtually zones public lands for various uses. For example,
if a mining claim for a hard rock mineral is filed, the land is dedicated to hard rock
mineral development regardless of the other present or future uses it might sustain.
30 U.S.C. § 22-39 (1994). Even public domain lands, which are to be managed under
a multiple-use sustained yield standard, Multiple-Use Sustained Yield Act of 1960, 16
U.S.C. §§ 528-31 (1994), which implies some co-existence of different uses, are, in
fact, managed to achieve either range use values, public recreational values or
wilderness values, but not all of these values at one time, because the managers lack
the tools and the will to reconcile the resulting conflicts. Coggins, supra note 30, at
63-65.
43. Noss, supra note 9 (conservation biology's adaptive management practices
are at odds with recognizing law's need for boundary certainty).
44. Biodiversity protection also requires site-specific decentralized decision-
making. However, devolution of these functions to local government offers the
potential of even greater habitat fragmentation and more intense controversies
about prospective land use. Local governments additionally lack the regulatory
authority and revenue to do the job. A. Dan Tarlock, Local Government Protection of
Biodiversity: What Is Its Niche?, 60 U. CHi. L. REV. 555 (1993).
45. For further discussion of the effect of notions of sustainability on the
management of public lands, see Robert B. Keiter, Beyond the Boundary Line:
Constructing a Law of Ecosystem Management, 65 U. COLO. L REV, 293 (1994); Keiter,
supra note 13; J.B. Ruhi, Biodiversity Conservation and the Ever-Expanding Web of Federal
Laws Regulating Nonfederal Lands: Time for Something Completely Different, 66 U. COLO. L.
REV. 555 (1995); General Accounting Office, Pub. No. GAO/RCED-94-11 1,
Ecosystem Management Additional Actions Needed to Adequately Test a
Promising Approach (1994).
46. Rodgers, supra note 12, at 890 (stating that natural systems resist law-
sanctioned boundaries between jurisdictions, between private and public property
holders, and between historically sanctioned entitlements and future needs).
47. Rasker, supra note 17, at 397. According to Bates, the National Forest
Services commodity stability policy which emphasizes commodity extraction as the
sole interest of public lands communities, ignores the multiplicity and diversity of
these communities. See Bates, supra note 16.
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demographic changes' underlying this new economy are also undermining
the model's legal systems and institutions that cater to commodity
extraction interests.49
The process by which decisions are made about the management and
allocation of public resources on public lands has remained largely closed
to broad-based citizen participation and heavily weighted toward special
interests with their greater resources. The formalism of this process,
-together with its bipolar and essentially adversarial structure," imposes
multiple barriers to participation by inchoate, diversified communities. The
common practice of land managers under the "dominant federal" model to
record the voices from these diverse communities as "little more than chits
on a tally sheet"5' is contributing to the crisis in public confidence in the
ability of the federal government to manage public domain lands. 2
48. Such changes include increasing urbanization, the growing political power
of recreationists and preservationists, and the appearance of multiple public lands
communities. Rasker writes about the "footloose techno-yuppies with portable
computers" or "modem cowboys," who have made policies of multiple-use sustained-
yield begin to lose their meaning." Rasker, supra note 17, at 396. Cowart and Fairfax
note that these changes are also providing an impetus for states to affect greater
interest in increasing state fiscal and environmental controls over public lands
resources. See Cowart & Fairfax, supra note 6.
49. Wilkinson also describes at great length the extent to which the legal
system, upon which the dominant federal model is based, has sustained a set of
practices and policies that have historically favored large, single interests which are
now asynchronous with modern values. See Wilkinson, supra note 15.
50. Marcus E. Ethridge comments that the administrative process, with its
procedures designed under the influence of legal values and doctrines, is clearly
"better suited to producing effective adversarial arrangements with appropriate
protection of private rights than to creating avenues for public involvement in policy
making." Marcus E. Ethridge, Procedures for Citizen Involvement in Environmental Policy: An
Assessment of Policy Effects, in CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN PUBLIC DECISION MAKING 115, 128-29
(lack DeSario & Stuart Langton eds., 1987).
51. Rasker, supra note 17, at 393 (quoting Sarah F. Bates, Discussion Paper: The
Changing Management Philosophies of the Public Lands, in W. LANDS REP. No. 3 (1993)).
Rasker goes on to point out that this "head-counting" approach to conflict resolution
actually foments polarization and conflict, and according to Wilkinson, is exploited
by the federal land management agencies so that they can be seen as a
"compromising, reasonable, middle of the road entity." Id. (quoting Charles F.
Wilkinson, Toward an Ethic of Place, in BEYOND THE MYTHIC WEST 71, 74(1990)).
52. Both Rasker and Flournoy write about the need for natural resource
managers to adopt different analytical techniques to account for the ever-increasing
complexity of our relationship to the natural environment; techniques, which are
predicated upon the existence of many different public lands communities and are
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The "dominant federal" model causes significant tensions on the
nation's public lands. The model also presents substantial barriers to
rational ecosystem management and enhanced community-based
involvement in the decision-making process affecting these lands. These
problems undermine the model's positive features, namely the theoretical
prospect that its application will achieve national norms and prevent inter-
state distributional inequities. But, do models proposing a more
cooperative mode of governance offer any better prospect?
!II. Alternative Models of Cooperative Federalism
The article examines three "cooperative federalism" models found in
other areas of environmental law." The first is the "dual regulation" or "state
primacy" model, under which states are administratively delegated
regulatory primacy to enforce federal laws through existing state laws and
institutions. The second is the "collaborative management" or "consensus-
based" model, under which a joint federal, multi-state institution is created
for the sole purpose of developing consensus derived plans that will be used
by the various jurisdictions to manage federal designated natural resources.
The final model is the "layered federalism" or "consistency" model, under
which individual states develop and administer natural resource
management plans with which proposed federal activities must be
consistent. 4 An analysis of each of these models shows that at least two of
responsive to their needs. Rasker believes that the market-based approach merits
serious attention as an additional management tool to be applied selectively as a
supplement to the scientific and public participation models of management.
Rasker, supra note 17, at 393-96. While Flournoy favors the "multiple alternative-
multiple attribute analysis developed by a working group convened by the federal
government for the systematic identification and assessment of the values affected
by wetlands alterations. Alyson C. Flournoy, Coping with Complexity, 27 Loy, L.A. L. REV.
809, 817-19 (1994). One of the advantages, Flournoy notes in the multiple
alternative-multiple attribute model is that it provides not only decision-makers, but
members of the public with a clear view of the policy choices to be made, making
regulatory decisions more accessible to the public and therefore, more democratic,
which, in turn, may increase public acceptance of regulatory decisions, Id. at 823.
53. While it will be quickly apparent, even from the abbreviated descriptions of
the three alternative models set forth in the text above, that each contains features
of the other and even of the "dominant federal" model, they are still sufficiently
different from each other and the existing model to warrant the comparative analysis
undertaken in the Article.
54. For a discussion of the perils of using either the "dual regulation" or
"layered federalism" models to regulate the conversion of wetlands, see Oliver A.
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them offer some advancement over the existing "dominant federal" model
and thus suggest some direction for improvements to it."
A. "The State Primacy" or "Dual Regulation" Model
The first model is the state primacy or "dual regulation" model used by
the federal pollution control laws. Under this model, federal regulatory
authority is administratively delegated to states with federally approved
programs giving the states de jure primary regulatory authority to implement
federal directives." Federal funds are granted annually to offset the costs of
administering the federal program."
The "dual regulation" model, at least facially, offers substantial
enhancement of the state role in administering federal law, as state
agencies, laws and courts replace their federal equivalents. However,
although states develop, implement and enforce their own regulatory
programs under this model, these programs must be consistent with (at
least as stringent as) their federal counterpart. 8 To assure this result, the
Houck & Michael Rolland, Federalism in Wetlands Regulation: A Consideration of Delegation of
Clean Water Act Section 404 and Related Programs to the States, 54 MD. L. REV. 1242 (1995).
55. It is difficult to ascertain to what extent the problems identified in both the
current "dominant federal" model and three alternative models are attributable to
defects in the models themselves or to the individuals working within the models. As
such an analysis would move this Article far beyond its intended purpose, this
confounding factor is merely noted here as one warranting further examination
before the "chairs are rearranged on the decks of the Titanic."
56. The classic example of this model can be found in § 402 of the Clean
Water Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1994) (national pollution discharge elimination
system permits).
57. See, e.g., CWA § 106, 33 U.SC. § 1256 (1994) (grants to states and interstate
agencies to assist them in administering programs for the prevention, reduction and
elimination of pollution, including enforcement directly or through appropriate state
law enforcement officers or agencies).
58. See, e.g., CWA § 510, 33 U.S. C. § 1370 (1994) (states may not adopt or
enforce standards, which are "less stringent than" federal standards). Stewart chafes
at this dictating of conduct within other institutions and recommends instead the
use of indirect methods, such as transferable pollution credits, to achieve the
desired "strategic coupling" of the institution's decision with national norms and
goals. Stewart, supra note 25, at 352-53. To the extent that this arrangement might
also be viewed as "commandeering" the legislative and administrative processes of
state governments, the specter of New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 156,
(1992), must be countered with. See Powell, supra note 22 (criticizing the Court's
historical analysis); Aithouse, supra note 25 (exploring recent evolution in Court's
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federal government closely oversees state compliance with federal
standards 9 and retains authority to reassert federal jurisdiction, restrict or
condition federal funding of the state program, or enforce directly, if state
performance is deemed derelict."0 Although the "dual regulation" model has
some positive features, chief among which is the prospect that its insistence
on uniform standards will achieve national norms and avoid inequities
among the states, the model has some serious deficiencies making its
application to public domain lands problematic.6
The first of these problems is its uneasy historical fit with the public
lands experience, despite the fact that both models rest on a presumption of
federal authority to regulate the activities proscribed by Congress. 2 The very
practical reasons behind delegating primary jurisdiction to implement
pollution control laws to the states, i.e., the nation's size- and geographic
diversity, the close relationship between pollution and land use (long
considered a local prerogative), the federal government's limited resources,
and the states' previous experience administering laws of this type, only
federalism jurisprudence revealing its points of convergence, but ultimate divergence
over its meaning).
59. See, e.g., CWA § 402(d), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(d) 91994) (federal review of state-
issued national pollution discharge elimination system permits).
60. See, e.g., CWA § 402(c), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(c) (1994) (criteria for withdrawal of
federal approval of state national pollution discharge elimination system permit
programs).
61. This feature is of particular importance in the field of pollution control,
where the concern is that the absence of a strong federal presence will result in "an
uneven playing field dotted with pollution havens." Houck & Rolland, supra note 54,
at 1299-1300.
62. The extent to which states may be compelled to implement federal
directives premised on Commerce Clause jurisdiction has been thrown into question
by several recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Florida v.
Florida, 64 U.S.L.W. 64 (March 26, 1996) (holding Congress lacks power under Indian
Commerce Clause to abrogate states' Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in
federal court); Lopez v. United States, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995) (striking down the Gun
Free School Zone Act on the ground it exceeded Congress' Commerce Clause
authority since possession of a gun in a local school zone is not an economic activity
substantially affecting interested commerce). New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144
(1992) (holding unconstitutional "take title" provision of the Low-Level Radioactive
Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985 to the extent it "commandeered" the
legislative processes of the states).
63. Wickersham, supra note 25 (dominant model of land use regulation in this
country is local control of land use through "Euclidean" zoning).
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partially resonate with the public lands experience.' Although there is
diversity among the types of public domain lands and their acreage is vast,
the "dominant federal" model requires fewer federal resources to administer
than are required for the administration of pollution control programs
regulating millions of individual sources.65 Further, no argument for state
primacy on public lands based on experience or local prerogative can be
made, because the prevailing "dominant federal" model excluded (and still
excludes) the states from any meaningful management role. Thus, the
state experience administering pollution control laws at the state level
before the 1970s was significantly more substantial, although less
felicitous,' than the state experience managing resources on state public
67
and school trust lands.'
64. It is interesting to note that these reasons resulted in state regulatory
primacy to administer pollution control programs, even though there was a sense
with regard to federal regulatory and social programs in general that the national
government's performance would be superior to that of the states and that federal
programs were correctives for state and local neglect and local entrenchment of
privilege. Stewart, supra note 25, at 340.
65. To give the reader an idea of the enormity of the regulatory universe
administered by the states, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency collects
information under various federal pollution control laws about more than 30,000
abandoned or uncontrolled hazardous waste sites, 328 toxic chemicals released to
the air, water and land from more than 17,000 manufacturing facilities, and has a
database for water quality information alone that contains over 170 million data
points on surface and groundwater quality, sediments, streamflow, and fish tissue
contamination, which provides information on which regulatory programs principally
administered by the states are based. Council on Environmental Quality, supra note
40, at 260-61.
66. Marc Melnick Y Elizabeth Willes, Watching the Candy Store: EPA Overfiling of
Local Air Pollution Variances, 20 ECOLOGY L.Q. 207, 253-54 (1993) (noting reluctance of
state and local districts to enact stringent environmental regulations).
67. According to a 1970 survey conducted by the Public Land Law Review
Commission, states administer about 4% of the total land mass of the United States.
These lands include approximately 20 million acres of lands designated as forests
and 13% of the lands used for grazing under government (federal or state) control.
Excluding Alaska, state agencies control nearly as much land as federal agencies
dedicated to propagation of fish and wildlife, but a significantly smaller fraction of
the total land dedicated to public park use. PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW COMMISSION, STATE
LAND RESOURCES AND POLICIES, at S-1, S-2 (1970). More recent information about the
acreage administered by the states can be found in Western State Land
Commissioners Association, 1991-92 Directory, tbl. 1 (1992) (states hold more than
45 million acres), quoted in Bruce & Rice, supra note 41, at 2. See also Sally K. Fairfax et
West & Northwest, Vol. 14, No. 1, Winter 2008
The "dual regulation" model also has some serious design deficiencies
which might lessen its effectiveness when applied to the nation's public
domain lands. First, the model tries unsuccessfully to synthesize two
inherently conflicting goals - state primacy and the achievement of national
norms. This tension often emerges in matters involving state enforcement of
federal pollution control mandates. States generally prefer a more
cooperative, flexible approach toward environmental enforcement than
allowed under the federal law. State agencies want to accommodate local
industries and are sensitive to local political pressure. Federal agencies,
mindful of federal mandates that specifically disallow "local"
considerations, 9 walk a tightrope between the state's desire for flexibility
and the national need for uniformity and consistency."
Further, a governance design, in which one jurisdiction takes the lead
in developing policies the other has primary responsibility for
implementing, is bound to cause conflict.7' Indeed, the federal-state
al., The School Trust Lands: A Fresh Look at Conventional Wisdom, 22 ENVTL. L. 797, 832
(1992) (41 million acres managed as grant lands).
68. For example, Fairfax et al., find in state management of school trust lands,
models and approaches to public resource management that might "enrich
discussions of public resource management now dominated by desiccated and
polarized issues arising at the federal level." Fairfax et al., supra note 67, at 803. See
also Cowart & Fairfax, supra note 6. For critical views of state land management, see
heidelberg, supra note 41, at 1582 (current framework governing management of state
school lands should be modified); Bruce & Rice, supra note 41, at 23-26 (land
management polices of western states is lagging behind times because states view
public lands primarily as income source and believe their resources are perpetual).
69. Melnick & Willes, supra notes 66, at 235.
70. James Elder, former Director, EPA Office and Water Enforcement and
Permits, has described this relationship as "EPA's tightrope walk between the need
for national consistency and state flexibility in implementation." James R. Elder,
Regulation of Water Quality: Is EPA Meeting its Obligation or Can the States Better Meet Water
Quality Challenges?, in AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, FEDERAL VERSUS STATE ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION STANDARDS: CAN A NATIONAL POLICY BE IMPLEMENTED LOCALLY? 20 (1990).
71. See generally E. Donald Elliott, Federal Versus State Environmental Protection
Standards: Can a National Policy Be Implemented Locally? Keynote Presentation: Making the
Partnership Work, 22 ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,010 (1992); Melnick & Willes,
supra note 66; General Accounting Office, Pub. No. GAO/RCED-95-64, EPA and the
States: Environmental Challenges Require a Better Working Relationship (1995). For
a more salutary view of the ameliorative effects of this conflict, see Houck and
Rolland who label as "accidental genius" the dual agency review model of the federal
wetlands permitting program, the protective qualities of which are further enhanced
by the participation of other federal and state agencies as well as the public. They
attribute to the model a "creative tension" that helps offset the power of money,
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relationship in the "dual regulation" model has been burdened almost to the
point of disability by allegations of inconsistent federal oversight and micro-
management of state programs, wasteful duplication of effort, delayed and
conflicting decision, and lack of finality.72
The "dual regulation" model, with its reluctant sharing of power with
the states, has not productively synthesized the conflicts between the two
jurisdictions.73 The model's concentric, overlapping power sharing structure
reflects an inherent distrust of state performance, a distrust almost as great
as that reflected in the "dominant federal" model that grants states no role
at all in the administration of federal land management programs. A model
that is premised on distrust of the state partner and results in strained inter-
influence and private property rights and warn that "[alny regulatory program that
vests decision-making authority exclusively in one agency runs the great risk of
failure." Houck & Rolland, supra note 54, at 1312.
72. General Accounting Office, supra note 71. The states additionally complain
that federal funds and technical assistance are insufficient to offset the burden of
being the primary regulatory authority. For an analysis of EPA overfilling of local air
pollution variances, including the reasons why EPA engages in this practice, see
Melnick & Willes, supra note 66. Yet complete absence of federal oversight would be
as inappropriate on public lands as it would be under the pollution control laws
given the need in both situations for national uniformity to avoid industry forum
shopping and inequity among the several states. Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of
Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating State Implementation of National Environmental
Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196 (1977).
73. This concept of "sharing power" with the states might have been baffling to
the Framers of the Constitution, who, although they shared the assumption that
sovereignty was unitary and exclusive and, therefore either the national Congress or
state legislatures had to predominate, during the course of the debates grew to
accept the idea that both the central (or national) government and the states could
exercise sovereignty in their separate spheres. Consistent with that vision, Madison
argued that the greatest sphere of government activity would be at the state level.
However, anti-Federalists feared the effect of Madison's vision of federalism would
be to reduce states to the status of towns, retaining only the power to levy taxes, and
to create a consolidated national government. Powell, supra note 22, at 656 n. 117. See
generally id. at 652-64. According to some scholars, power sharing is a natural
outgrowth of the structural, administrative, cultural, and political forces at play in the
twentieth century. Kramer, supra note 22. For a modern-day affirmation of Madison's
view of where the most relevant political authority would reside for citizens, see id. at
1504 (stating that the law that most affects people in their daily lives is still
overwhelmingly state law).
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governmental relationships would be no improvement over the "dominant
federal" model.74
In addition, the political unpopularity of federal oversight "sticks"75 and
limited federal resources supporting their use results in uneven, often
ineffective federal oversight. Ineffective federal oversight of state
performance curtails the federal government's capacity to counter-balance
excessive state responsiveness to local political and economical pressure.
This puts at risk the model's ability to achieve national norms and avoid
distributional inequities among the several states, undermining the
theoretical advantages of the model.76 At the same time, the pressure to
maintain national norms makes the federal government uneasy about
approving experimentation and diversity in state regulatory programs.77
Therefore, the "dual regulation" model might inhibit federal land managers
from responding to the need for regional variations in natural resource
management strategies.
The "dual regulation" model does not correct the problems caused by
the fragmentation of natural systems by political boundaries, since it
preserves the state as the decision-making unit." The "dual regulation"
74. Although the "dual regulation" model appears to disperse power more
than the "dominant federal" model, reducing the capture possibilities, in actuality
there is no difference. BLM administers is programs through field offices in the
several states and thus presents as dispersed a target as the state natural resource or
land management agencies.
75. See, e.g., CWA § 402(c), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(c) (1994) (resumption of federal
primacy); CWA § 106(f)(2), 33 U.S.C. § 1256(f)(2) (1994) (conditioning or reduction of
federal grants): Clean Air Act (CAA) § 179(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7509 (1994) (highway funds
are cut off for non-attainment areas).
76. For example, as Melnick and Willes point out revocation of state
enforcement authority under the CAA would be unwise because the states do 70% to
90% of all enforcement under that law. Melnick & Willes, supra note 66, at 246.
77. Various mechanisms in the "dual regulation" model allow foi site-specific
adjustments to national standards (e.g.,, state water quality standards and state
implementation plans under the CAA) and local experimentation (variances) and
provide some accommodation between local needs and national standards. Some
commentators criticize these devices because the over-arching goals of a program
(i.e., its national norms) tend to get lost in ad hoc process of examining the equities
in individual cases. Melnick & Willes, supra note 66, at 254.
78. For a discussion of how insensitive and inadequate the pollution control
laws are with respect to preserving biodiversity, see Jon D. Hoist, The Unforseeability
Factor: Federal Lands, Managing for Uncertainty, and the Preservation of Biological Diversity, 13
PuB. LAND. L. REV. 113 (1992). See also General Accounting Office, Pub. No.
CAO/RCED096-42, Water Pollution: Differences Among the States in Issuing Permits
Limiting the Discharge of Pollutants (1996) (explaining that variations in discharge
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model allows states to develop regulatory regimes that reflect a state's
priorities with respect to use of the ambient environment.79 These regimes
can bisect an inter-state resource like a river or an airshed, artificially
dividing the ambient environment at the state's boundary.8" Only rarely does
the model allow for regional planning or standard setting8' opening only a
very small window for implementing the cross-jurisdictional, landscape-
oriented protection favored by conservation biologists.82
Further, as principally a creature of the administrative state, the
content and contours of the "dual regulation" model, even more than those
of the "dominant federal" model, are formed, shaped and reformed through
the formalism of the administrative process.83 This formalism, together with
the bipolar and adversarial nature of administrative proceedings and their
dependence on "specialized scientific knowledge, technical jargon,"84 and
limits or in standards and procedures used to derive these limits, have been the
source of concern, particularly, when neighboring jurisdictions share water bodies).
79. This is the concept behind the CAA's state implementation plan (SIP). 42
U.S.C. § 7410 (1994). See Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246 (1976). Allowing states
to localize national standards also underlies the concept of state water quality
standards found in the CWA. 33 U.S.C. § 1313 (1994). See also 33 U.S.C. § 131 l(b)(l)(C)
(1994) (water quality based on effluent limits).
80. See, e.g., Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91 (1992). See also General
Accounting Office, supra note 78 (explaining that variations in discharge limits or
standards and procedures used to derive these limits, have been the source of
concern, particularly when neighboring jurisdictions share water bodies). Another
example of states being unable to manage a resource collectively can be found in the
debates over the adoption of the zero emission vehicle (ZEV) as the standard for
emissions of ozone precursors in the Northeast. Susan Bruninga, Air Pollution: OTC
Reaffirms Support for 49-State Car, States Rights, DAILY ENV'T REP., Mar. 1, 1995; Jennifer
Silverman, Air Pollution: Individual States Remain Adamant About ZEV Mandate, Despite Big
Three Letter, DAILY ENV'T REP. July 13, 1995; Air Pollution: Decision on Auto Plan for Northeast
Delayed Until Mid-December Agency Says, DAILY ENV'T REP., Nov. 18, 1994.
81. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g) (1994) (convening of interstate management
conference to address interstate water quality problems); Id. § 1288 (area-wide waste
treatment management plans); Id. § 1289 (river basin plans).
82. Hoist, supra note 78, at 133.
83. For examples of this formalism in the CWA, see CWA §§ 402(b)(3), (c)(3),
33 U.S.C. §§ 1342(b)(3), (c)(3), (1994) (state program delegation and federal
resumption of regulatory jurisdiction, respectively). See also CWA § 309(g)(4), 33
U.S.C. § 1319(g)(4) (1994) (enforcement).
84. Thomas L. Van Valey & James C. Petersen, Public Service Centers: The Michigan
Experience, in CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN PUBLIC DECISION MAKING 39 (Jack DeSario & Stuart
Langton eds., 1987).
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lawyers, creates multiple barriers to public participation, 85 especially by
inchoate, fragmented community-based interest groupings.6 Studies have
shown that elaborate administrative procedures have had little success in
democratizing administrative decision-making.87 What public access is
produced is systematically unrepresentative of the public interest and favors
interests that are already influential.88 For example, public hearings, when
they do occur, often occur late in the decision making process, at
inconvenient times (i.e., during working hours), are inhibiting in format, and
frequently pit ordinary citizens against technical experts from the agency or
applicant.8 9 The agencies administering these proceedings have neither the
flexibility nor resources to respond, other than in the most superficial way,
to the cacophony of voices heard in typical public hearing or formal written
submission. 90 The process responds best to the entrenched, familiar voices
that collect around unified positions.9'
85. Jurisdictional barriers, such as standing, and the need to develop a
persuasive administrative record impose real costs on participants in the
administrative process. Robert B. Reich, Public Administration and Public Deliberation: An
Interpretive Essay, 94 YALE L.J. 1617, 1624 (1985). For a general discussion of the
administrative process, see James T. Harrington & Barbara A. Frick, Opportunities for
Public Participation in Administrative Rulemaking, 15 NAT. RESOURCEs LAW, 537 (1983).
86. The administrative and judicial processes require participant to distill their
interests into highly focused, oppositional statements or positions. Although one
may be able to identify discrete public lands communities, these communities are
made up of many people with different interests and values which cannot easily be
reduced to single, unitary positions. Bates, supra note 16. See also Reich, supra note 85,
at 1624.
87. Ethridge, supra note 50, at 115, 122. Ethridge goes on to say "citizen
participation encouraged by formal hearing procedures has not often contributed to
the 'complicated, creative balancing of conflicting interests in controversial areas:
Instead, it has frequently served to make discussions of public policies more
ideological, more difficult, and less representative of the broader public interest." Id.
at 124.
88. Ethridge, supra note 50, at 115, 129 (quoting Walter A. Rosenbaum, The
Paradoxes of Public Participation, Administration and Society 8:3:355-83 (1976).
89. Jurisdictional standing to secure judicial review of administrative decisions,
the technicality and complexity of the record, costs, and other procedural formalities
create barriers to public participation under this model. Owen M. Fiss, Comment,
Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1073-78 (1984); Melanie Rowland, Bargaining for Life:
Protecting Biodiversity Through Mediated Agreements, 22 ENVTL. L. 503, 519 (1992).
90. See supra note 54 and accompanying text. See also Bates, supra note 16, at 91
(noting that most public hearings are arranged to impede community consensus).
91. Reich, supra note 85, at 1624.
West s Northwest, Vol. 14, No. I, Winter 2008
There is little reason to expect, therefore, that transferring the "dual
regulation" model to public domain would eliminate problems with the
"dominant federal" model. The model might even exacerbate existing
federal-state tensions on public domain lands and lead to further erosion of
national norms despite the theoretical promise of the reverse result. The
model does nothing to eliminate the existing politically fragmented natural
landscape, and its complete dependence on the administrative process for
making decisions may erect additional barriers to diversified, community-
based public participation in the public lands management decision-
making process.
B. The "Federal-State Consensus" Or "Collaborative
Management" Model
The second model is the federal-state consensus or "collaborative
management" model employed by the Clean Water Act's National Estuary
Program.92 Under this model, the federal government funds and facilitates
the development of an institution to develop a plan to address the
environmental and resource depletion problems caused by unregulated
human activities in the estuary.93 There is much to commend in this model
for the management of public domain lands.
First, estuaries and public domain lands share common historical
predicates. Both are multi-jurisdictional and have historically functioned as
unregulated commons." Federal land holdings in many parts of the West are
neither unified nor integrated, but inter-mixed with state and private
92. 33 U.S.C. § 1330 (1994), The progenitor of the federal-state consensus
model found in the National Estuary Program is the interstate management plan
developed by Maryland, Virginia, Pennsylvania, and the District of Columbia to
restore and protect the Chesapeake Bay. For a detailed chronology of the
development of that plan and the Chesapeake Bay program, see Marjorie A. Hutter,
The Chesapeake Bay: Saving a National Resource Through Multi-State Cooperation, 4 VA. J. NAT.
RESOURCES L. 186 (1985).
93. Agricultural, industrial, municipal, recreational, and other activities on the
land can both directly and indirectly affect estuarine water quality and
hydrodynamics. Both atmospheric and land based pollutants can concentrate in and
be retained by an estuary. Robert D. Hayton, Reflections on the Estuarine Zone, 31 NAT.
RESOURCES 1. 123, 136 (1991). According to Hayton, these problems have brought on a
crisis of global proportions. Id. at 125.
94. The estuarine zone is not sharply delineated, but like any ecosystem is a
dynamic, sometimes turbulent, and often extensive region. Thus, many states may
find themselves in the estuarine zone even though their citizens may not directly
benefit from its existence. For a description of the estuarine (or interface) zone and
the value of the estaurine systems, see id.
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holdings." Further, development on public lands is often tied to
development on nearby state and private lands. 96 This checkerboard pattern
of intermingled land holdings continues today making integrated
management of public domain lands and multi-jurisdictional challenge.97
Public domain lands have also historically functioned as an
unregulated commons, susceptible to Hardin's "tragedy."98 Although public
domain lands may not be a "true" or "legal" commons, as they are subject to
laws regulating their use and access, they function as a de facto commons,
because these laws have not been consistently enforced.9  Unauthorized use
and access to these lands occurred historically and continues to occur
today.' 0 Therefore, the public domain lands experience appears to be more
95. As pointed out by Cowart and Fairfax, surface title is not the only
complexity in the pattern of western land ownership as a result of the federal
practice of retaining subsurface mineral rights when it deeded away land to
homesteaders and ranchers. Cowart & Fairfax, supra note 6, at 410-12.
96. Id. at 410 (noting particularly the contentiousness of access to federal
lands surrounded by state or private lands.)
97. Again, according to Cowart and Fairfax, the reality of western land
ownership patterns invites (some might say requires) some level of state and local
involvement in the management of public domain lands and resources. Id. The
theoretical framework for these observations can be found in the work of Grodzins
and others. MORTON GRODZINS, THE AMERICAN SYSTEM: A NEW VIEW OF GOVERNMENT IN THE
UNITED STATES (1966), cited in Fairfax et al., supra note 6, at 420 n.17. For further
explication of this theoretical framework and its progenitors, see Kramer, supra note 22.
98. See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968),
reprinted in Managing the Commons (Garrett Hardin & James Baden eds., 1977) (where
many actors share the same resource, rational choice leads to the resource's
eventual destruction, because an individual's short term gain exceeds her harm and
the harm to the resource can be dispersed among its many users).
99. James Huffman, The Inevitability of Private Rights in the Public Lands, 65 U. COLO.
L. REV. 241, 259 (1994). Huffman argues that well into the twentieth century most
non-commodity resources, like wildlife, hiking, camping, and boating, were free for
the taking. Id. at 260. These unauthorized uses were then legitimized by the
preemption laws. Id. at 259 (discussion of preemption laws). Huffman goes on to
argue that unlimited equal access will lead to the tragedy of the commons and its
destruction, and while limiting equal access may alleviate distributional and
degradation problems, this can only be accomplished at an unacceptably high cost
to average individual welfare. Id. at 271.
100. For example, the failure of BLM to control access by cattle to public
domain lands makes the public lands a commons for that purpose and, according to
most experts, is the reason for the loss of hundreds of millions of acres of arid and
semi-arid land in the western United States. George C. Coggins, Livestock Grazing on the
Public Lands: Lessons from the Failure of Official Conservation, 20 GONZ. L. REV. 749 (1984-85);
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congruent with the "collaborative management" model than with the "dual
regulation" model.
The multi-jurisdictional and un-regulated commons characteristics of
estuaries resulted in the formulation of a. collaborative, non-directive
governance model, quite different in approach from "dominant federal" or
"dual regulation" models.'0 ' The National Estuary Program's "collaborative
management" model establishes an institutional framework and process for
preparation of a multi-state plan to restore and maintain the ecological
integrity of designated estuaries."2 The plan is prepared under the aegis of a
"management conference" composed of representatives from all affected
political jurisdictions (i.e., federal, state and local governments and inter-
state governmental entities) and interests in the estuarine zone.'
Management plans can only be approved by the federal government upon
Coggins et al., The Law of Public Rangeland Management 1: The Extent and Distribution of
Federal Power, 12 ENVTL. L. 535 (1982); Myra Klockenbrink, The New Range War Has the
Desert as a Foe, N.Y. TiMES, Aug. 20, 1991, at C-4.
101. Under our constitutional system of government, one state has no power
to control another; and the federal sovereign has neither the political will nor the
resources to force a federal solution on the states in an historically unregulated,
multi-state commons. For examples of unsuccessful attempts by states to control
water pollution in adjacent states, see Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91 (1992); City
of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981). For a discussion of some other examples
of regional planning by states, see Paul D. Banker, Jr., Note, the Chesapeake Bay
Preservation Act: The Problem with State Land Regulation of Interstate Resources, 31 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 735, 739-44 (1990).
102. As part of the plan development process, the management conference
assesses trends in the estuary's water quality, the viability of its natural resources
and designated uses, collects and analyzes data on the causes of the estuary's
decline, and provides for the coordinated implementation of the plan by federal,
state and local agencies. 33 U.S.C. § 1330(b) (1994). The Conference also has the
authority to determine the extent to which federal projects and programs are
consistent with the plan.
103. States, federal agencies, regional and international authorities,
educational institutions, and interested members of the public in the designated
"estuarine zone" form the membership of the Management Conference. 33 U.S.C. §
1330(c) (1994). Given the breadth of the statutory definition of the term "estuarine
zone," (includes "associated aquatic ecosystems and those portions of tributaries
draining into the estuary up to the historic height of migration of anadromous fish or
the historic head of tidal influence, whichever is higher," 33 U.S.C. § 1330(k) (1994)),
it is not unreasonable to conclude that the intent of the drafters was to include as
many jurisdictions in the planning process as possible.
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concurrence by the affected states' governors.0 4 Once approved, any federal
action must be consistent with the plan.' °
The "collaborative management" model, on its face, provides for
significant reductions in federalism tensions. The parties operate in a non-
hierarchical (i.e., the requirement for state concurrence), cooperative effort
to design a solution to what is perceived to be a shared problem.0 6 This
contrasts sharply with the hierarchical, non-parity, directive federal-state
relationship in both the "dominant federal" and "dual regulation" models.
Under the "collaborative management" model, the federal government
functions as a facilitator, not an overseer, of state and local participation, as
opposed to performance, and as a provider of technical and financial
resources to aid in plan development. Acceptance of the plan at the local
level is enhanced because of direct participation in plan design by state and
local governments and the increased likelihood such participation has
resulted in a document more sensitive to state and local concerns.
However, the consensus process can also generate substantial
transaction costs0 7 and result in a compromised final product.0 ' There are
104. 33 U.S.C. § 1330(f) (1994).
105. 33 U.S.C. § 1330(b)(7) (1994). The effect of the consistency mechanism
under the "collaborative management" model is less clear than under the "layered
federalism" model. Only those programs which are listed in the Catalog of Federal
Domestic Assistance are covered by § 320(b)(7), 33 U.S.C. § 1330(b)(7) (1994), and
the mechanism is tied into a review process triggered by Executive Order 12,372,
reprinted as amended, 31 U.S.C. § 6506 (1994). While the Executive Order blocks
implementation of inconsistent federal programs, the Order is not codified in the
statute and is thus subject to modification by subsequent presidents.
106. On the topic of inter-state cooperation and federalism see Note, To Form a
More Perfect Union?: Federalism and Informal Interstate Cooperation, 102 HARV. L. REV. 842
(1989). The author's analysis of the National Association of Attorneys General
vertical restrain guidelines demonstrates how interstate cooperation preserves the
core values of federalism (liberty, civic participation, and diversity).
107. The model requires the creation of a separate, new institution (the
management conference), multiple public hearings, and extensive information
gathering and analysis. 33 U.S.C. § 1330 (1994). Reflecting the additional time it takes
to create a document by committee, most of the plans developed under this model
have taken in excess of four years to complete. HOWARD RAIFFA, THE ART AND SCIENCE OF
NEGOTIATION 215-55. See also LAWRENCE SUSSKIND & JEFFREY CRUIKSHANK, BREAKING THE
IMPASSE: CONSENSUAL APPROACHES TO RESOLVING PUBLIC DISPUTES 10-15 (1987)
(identifying some of the questions raised by negotiating public disputes).
108. Fiss, supra note 89, at 1073-78; Rowland, supra note 89, at 519. See also
Frank P. Grad, Alternative Dispute Resolution in Environmental Law, 14 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L.
157, 184 (1989) (ADR's "win-win" trade-off is deceptive because if everyone gains, it is
likely that someone not involved in the trade will have to pay and, in the
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no controlling norms guiding federal approval of the plan, no requirement
that the plan even meet federal standards, unlike the "dual regulation"
model."°9 Therefore, there is no way of assuring that distribution inequities
between estuaries in different parts of the country will not be created.
Further, plan implementation depends upon the voluntary cooperation of
affected jurisdictions and must await separate action by state and local
governments conforming their laws to whatever new standards or
procedures are required by the plan."' The management conference has no
continuing function once the plan is approved.
The "collaborative management" model, however, does a significantly
better job than either the "dominant federal" or "dual regulation" models of
removing the barriers to rational ecosystem management, because it offers a
trans-political boundary institutional framework (the management
conference) for managing a regional resource. The goal of the model's
planning process is to synthesize and rationalize differences among the
affected states in how they manage the natural system; in other words, to
eliminate the artificial differences caused by political boundaries. Most
plans also provide for future plan adjustments, allowing for conservation
biology's adaptive management.''
The structure of the "collaborative management" model's management
conference, with its many different participants and its use of a consensus,
collaborative approach to decision-making (i.e., the planning process),
encourages diversity of views. A consensus approach is more open to
different communities than the formal bi-polar, adversarial approach of the
dominant federal" and "dual regulation" models."2 The democratic, more
environmental field, the loser may well be the public interest in preserving
environmental resources for the future).
109. See 33 U.S. C. § 1330(f) (1994) (approval procedures for the estuary plan
requires inclusion of priority corrective actions and compliance schedules to meet
the CWA's aspirational goals).
110. The CWA relies on the prospect of federal financial assistance to
encourage plan implementation. 33 U.S.C. § 1330(f)(2) (1994). As an ultra-
jurisdictional solution to a multi-state problem, unless states voluntarily incorporate
the directives of a management plan, the plan's implementation and enforcement is
totally dependent upon individual state enforcement authority, which cannot
transcend political boundaries.
111. Included in the plan are normative guidance (statutory and regulatory
standards) and shared aspirational goals, which may reduce future conflicts. 33
U.S.C. § 1330 (1994); 40 C.F.R. §§ 35.9000-35.9070 (1995).
112. Reich, supra note 85, at 1624 (discussing how current practice
policymaking ignores the views and interests of poor and diffused groups). The
author suggests that public deliberation is beneficial to these groups as it brings
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transparent nature of the planning process levels the playing field between
community-based interests and special interests. The participation of
community-based interests in the process also validates and strengthens the
interests they represent, increasing public confidence in the final product. "
While the "collaborative management" model harbors some significant
risks, such as transaction costs, the possibility of a compromised final
product and sacrificed national norms as well as implementation
uncertainty, it offers a means to overcome the federalism frictions now
present on public domain lands as well as the ecosystem management and
public participation problems inherent in both the "dominant federal" and
"dual regulation" models. The shared historical predicates with the
"dominant federal" model may also make the imposition of this consensus
driven model on public domain lands an easier fit than the "dual
regulation" model.
C. "Federal Consistency" Or "Layered Federalism" Model
The third, and final model is the "federal consistency" or "layered
federalism" model found in the Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA)." 4
Under this model, a state develops and administers a federally funded
coastal resource management program that meets uniform federal
standards."5 Federal activities (both within and outside the program area)
must be consistent with the state's program to the "maximum extent
practicable" unless contrary to the national interest."' Like the
"collaborative management" model, the "layered federalism" model has
much to commend it.
The historical experience underlying the "layered federalism" model,
however, is significantly different from the public lands' experience; closer to
that underlying the "dual regulation" model. The states' ability to manage
coastal areas was considered superior to that of the federal government,
because the states already had the necessary resources, administrative
machinery, enforcement powers, constitutional authority, and experience to
them together where they are able to recognize common interests and jointly create
new public values. Id. at 1635-36.
113. In addition, a consensus approach, in contrast to the formalistic or
adversarial approach of the "dominant federal" or "dual regulation" models, by
encouraging examination of assumptions, inclusive thinking and a means for finding
common ground among various interests, provides the ideal environment in which
to recognize different communities. Bates, supra note 16.
114. 16U.S.C.§ 1451-64(1994).
115. For a recitation of those standards, see 16 U.S.C. § 1455(d) (1994).
116. 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c) (1994); Secretary of the Interior v. California, 464 U.S.
312 (1984).
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do the job;" 7 historical predicates quite different from the states' experience
on public domain lands." ' Further, federal funds and the clear power shift to
the states was perceived as a means to correct past distributional inequity in
the coastal zone, where the nation as a whole had received the benefits of
coastal development and the impacted states bore all of the costs."9
Perceived distributional inequities on public lands have historically been
corrected or offset by federal funds, not by a redistribution of power.
While consistency between federal and state programs is not an
unfamiliar concept in the public lands context, the public lands version is
much weaker than that employed in the "layered federalism" model, more
aspirational than controlling.2 ' Under the "layered federalism" model, states
can veto a proposed federal initiative that is inconsistent with the states
program, giving the states considerable leverage against the federal
government. Under FLPMA, the federal planning process is merely to be
informed by state and local concerns. 2 ' BLM, not the states, makes the
consistency finding and BLM can reject a state or local standard, if the
interests of the federal government are not adequately preserved by that
standard.'22 Reserving this authority in the federal government reflects
117. Beyle, supra note 25. According to Houck and Rolland, the CZMA
"presumes" coastal land use is primarily a state affair, and provides funding with only
limited, programmatic federal review of state performance. Houck & Rolland, supra
note 54, at 1289.
118. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
119. Martin I. LaLonde, Note, Allocating Burden of Proof to Effectuate the Preservation
and Federalism Goals of the Coastal Zone Management Act, 92 MICH. L. REV. 438 (1993).
120. Leshy, supra note 25, at 109.
121. 43 U.S.C. § 1712(c)(9) (1994) ("ITIhe Secretary shall, to the extent he finds
practical, keep apprised of State, local and tribal land use plans.") Congress
intended, among other things, for FLPMA to increase the opportunities for state and
local governments as well as the general public to participate in land management
decisions. The Public Land Law Review Commission, whose recommendations
contributed to much of the content of FLPMA, noted many reasons for increasing the
role of state and local governments in the public land decision making process,
including the need to allow for more effective resolution of problems such as
depressed local tax revenues due to property tax immunity of federal lands and
zoning and pollution control problems on non-federal lands caused by uses of
contiguous federal lands. For a further discussion of this and other related points,
see Beyle, supra note 25, at 216.
122. 43 U.S.C. § 1712(c)(9) (1994) (land use plans shall be consistent with
state and local plans to the maximum extent the Secretary finds consistent with
federal law and the purposes of the Act.) See also Beyle, supra note 25, at 216. Under
the CZMA, state or local authorities determine the consistency of federal programs
with state coastal zone management plans. 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c) (1994).
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congressional belief that the integrity of the governing federal laws and
congressional policies should not be compromised by conflicting local
concerns, ' 23 a finding substantially at odds with the congressional findings
underlying the "layered federalism" model. 
24
Although the "layered federalism" model sounds similar iri some
respects to the "dual regulation" model, there are significant differences of
particular relevance to this analysis. The "layered federalism" model is more
truly a state-lead design than the "dual regulation" model. The model
envisions a strong role for state and local governments in the program area.
The state administers its coastal zone program without federal intrusion or
even participation.'25 Although states must consider federal interests in their
individual draft plans and conform to national criteria, they are largely left
free to develop and administer their programs without the federal
government second-guessing them.'26 And, while the federal government can
restrict or condition federal funding'27 and withdraw plan approval,'2 just
123. Beyle, supra note 25, at 222 n.1 16 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 1724, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess. 58 (1976)). Beyle writes of the contradictory desire of Congress to bring
states and local governments into the federal land management process more which
was tempered by an even stronger desire that federal primacy and control over public
lands was still considered essential given the prevailing state record on management
of their own lands. Id. at 216-17.
124. A key to more effective protection and use of the land and water
resources of the coastal zone is to encourage states to exercise their full authority
over the lands and waters in the coastal zone. 16 U.S.C. § 1451(i) (1994). Because of
their proximity to and reliance upon the coast and its resources, the coastal states
have substantial and significant interests in the protection, management, and
development of the resources of the exclusive economic zone that can only be served
by the active participation of coastal states in all federal programs affecting such
resources. Id. § 145 1(m).
125. In contrast, under CWA § 402(d) each state with delegated authority to
administer the national pollution discharge elimination system permit program must
submit to EPA a copy of each permit application received by the state. 33 U'S.C. §
1342(d) (1994). The state cannot issue a permit until 90 days have passed without
EPA noting its objection to the permit.
126. The Secretary of Commerce cannot approve any state management plan
unless the views of federal agencies principally affected by the plan have been
adequately considered, 16 U.S.C. § 1456(a) (1994), the plan provides for adequate
consideration of national interests involved in siting of energy facilities which are of
greater than local significance, id. § 1455(d)(8), and lands which are held in trust by
or subject solely to the discretion of the federal government are excluded from the
definition of "coastal zone," id. § 1453(1). See, Beyle, supra note 25, at 211-12.
127. 16 U.S.C. § 1458(c) (1994) (suspension of federal assistance if coastal
state failing to adhere to management program or grant terms).
West & Northwest, Vol. 14, No. 1, Winter 2008
like it can in the "dual regulation" model, federal oversight of state
performance under this model is considerably less objectionable to the
states, because the traditional federal "sticks" on the "dual regulation"
model are substantially offset in the "layered federalism" model by the
federal consistency provision.29
Further, since local concerns are elevated under the model as a result
of states being encouraged to tailor their plans to meet local needs, 3 ' the
federal consistency model, like the collaborative management model,
should also produce a product that is sensitive to these needs, and,
therefore, supported by the local communities. Thus, the friction inherent in
the "dual regulation" model's heavy reliance on federal oversight to achieve
desired state performance is not a significant factor in the "layered federalism"
128. Id. § 1458(d) (approval shall be withdrawn if coastal state fails to cure
defects in its compliance with its management program or grant terms).
129. State program authority to condition or reject outright certain types of
federal and federally-supported development has been upheld against claims of
preemption and interference with interstate commerce. Houck & Rolland, supra note
54, at 1297. See also Michael A. Wolf, Accommodating Tensions in the Coastal Zone: an
Introduction and Overview, 25 NAT. RESOURCE L.J. 7 (1985).
130. 16 U.S.C. § 1455(d) (1994). Another example of the extent to which the
coastal zone management program is, at least, structured to be sensitive to local
concerns can be found in § 306(d)(2)(B) in which states are enjoined not only to
establish an "effective mechanism" for continuing consultation with local
governments to assure their full participation in implementing the state's coastal
zone management program, but the mechanisms themselves must provide for an
opportunity for comment by local governments in any situation where
implementation of any management program decision would conflict with any local
zoning ordinance. 16 U.S.C. § 1455(d)(2)(B) (1994).
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model. 3' In fact, criticisms of the program have less to do with its governance
model than its limited financial resources and overly broad scope.32
The reduction in federalism tensions, however, is not without cost. A
state-lead program without clear national standards and federal oversight,
features of the "dual regulation" model can create substantial differences
and inequities among the states and be an invitation to industry forum
shopping.'33 By allowing each state unfettered authority to "resolve for its
own coastal area basic choices among competing uses for finite
resources,"' 34 no particular result in favor of any resource can be assured,
jeopardizing the achievement of national norms favoring protection of
those resources.135
The "layered federalism" model's effectiveness at controlling coastal
development and limiting environmental damage, just like the "dominant
federal model," depends on coordination between the various layers of
131. Supervision of state performance and enforcement of the Act by the
federal government, although of a continuing nature and comprehensive in scope,
generally leads only to non-binding suggestions for state program improvement,
Mandatory recommendations, according to Houck and Rolland, are restricted to
process-oriented improvements. The Secretary's only oversight stick is to suspend
federal funding, if a state fails to adhere to an approved program, and then only after
an elaborate process, which, again according to Houck and Rolland, serves as both a
shield against federal attempts to de-fund aggressive state programs and against
complaints of program violations in favor of development interests. The CZMA
provides no private federal cause of action against states, local governments or
private parties claimed to be in violation of state coastal management programs,
therefore, citizen oversight over state program performance is limited as well. See
generally Houck & Rolland, supra note 54, at 1294-99.
132. See Richard Hildreth & Ralph W. Johnson, CZM in California, Oregon, and
Washington, 25 NAT. RESOURCES 1. 103 (1985) (program's broad scope and federal
resource limitations threaten to enervate program or turn it into a one-issue
program).
133. Inequities are also created among applicants as a result of the
enhancement of the states' powers and the dominance of state and local concerns
over national concerns. The states' ability to impose more stringent requirements
can cause non-uniform changes in regulatory burdens imposed on applicants by
federal laws, regulatory differences between coastal and non-coastal states, and
higher transaction costs. Scott C. Whitney et al., State Implementation of the Coastal Zone
Management Consistency Provisions - Ultra Vires or Unconstitutional?, 12 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV.
67 (1988); cf. Beyle, supra note 25 at 214 (experience has shown CZMA dispute
resolution mechanism and the scheme of shared federal-state control have acted to
inhibit such strategic behavior).
134. Norfolk Southern Corp. v. Oberly, 632 F. Supp. 1225, 1247 (D. Del. 1986).
135. Houck & Rolland, supra note 54, at 1299.
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government as well as among agencies within each layer. 3 ' Yet, the
consistency mechanism can be its own cause of conflict between the various
layers of government despite the fact. its use should trigger intra-state
jurisdictional negotiations and offer a way to eliminate inconsistent
regulatory requirements among the different jurisdictions within a state,3
Experience with the model reveals that the different layers of government
operate independently of each other, with "tunnel vision" and a myopic
sense of territoriality.'38 This behavior can result in duplicate programs,
programmatic conflict, turf wars, and less environmental protection,
sounding remarkably like the experience under both the "dominant federal"
and "dual regulation" models.38 However, these problems are experienced
most keenly at the state and local level. State-local tensions replace the
federal-state tensions of the "dominant federal" and "dual regulation"
models, turning the model into a battleground for conflicting philosophies
over the distribution of power between state and local governments.,"
Although, the "layered federalism" model is limited by state
boundaries, like the "dominant federal" and "dual regulation" models, the
model holds somewhat more promise for achieving rational ecosystem
management than might be expected. The power to find parochial federal
programs inconsistent with broader state natural resource goals and the
importance of local concerns create an opportunity for making rational
ecosystem decisions in an ecologically defined area within a state. 4' In
addition, the planning approach underlying the "layered federalism" model,
as it underlies the "collaborative management" model, and the absence of
binding, uniform standards, a feature of the "dual regulation" model, allows
136. Ronald I. Rychlak, Coastal Zone Management and the Search for Integration, 40
DEPAUL L. REV. 981 (1991).
137. For a discussion of the dispute resolution mechanisms in the Coastal
Zone Management Act, see Beyle, supra note 25, at 212-14.
138. Rychlak, supra note 136, at 995. See also Whitney, et al., supra note 133
(providing another highly critical view of the federal consistency provision).
139. Rychlak, supra note 136, at 996.
140. Rychlak, supra note 136. While there is some reason to expect that the
same dynamic might happen in the "collaborative management" model with local
jurisdictions vying for power with their states, the presence of non-governmental
participants in the planning process and the federal government as a facilitator may
act to lessen the likelihood of this happening in that model.
141. This feature of the "layered federalism" model can be a double edged
sword with respect to protecting natural resources of nationally recognized value like
wetlands, as states can use this authority to stop environmentally protective federal
actions as well as destructive ones.
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for state experimentation and innovation,'42 and for conservation biology's
adaptive management principles to be applied' 43
The model is less inclusive of diverse public voices than might be
anticipated from its emphasis on planning. Broad public participation is
invited in state plan formulation' and state plans must include procedures
for public participation in the permitting process as well as consistency
determinations. 4 However, once the plan is approved, the process becomes
less inviting and inclusive and more hierarchical and formal, replicating the
barriers to participation by diverse public communities found in the "dual
regulation" model.'46
Although the historical predicates behind the federal consistency or
"layered federalism" model are less compelling when applied to the public
domain lands than the "collaborative management" model, the "layered
federalism" models does offer some benefits. The model appears to reduce
federal-state tensions, although, in practice, it may merely transfer those
tensions down a layer to state and local governments. The model also offers
some potential for rational ecosystem management within a state and
diversification of public participation in the decision-making process. The
model, however may cause high transaction costs for third parties, and does
not assure the fulfillment of national norms with respect to protection of
natural resources or prevent distributional inequities from occurring among
the several states.
IV. Conclusion
This discussion should make clear that no single model discussed in
this article offers a complete panacea to the federalism tensions, ecosystem
142. Houck and Rolland emphasize the "pliable" nature of not only the federal
standards governing approval of state coastal programs, but also in how states
structure their management programs and define the extent of their coastal
jurisdiction. Houck & Rolland, supra note 54, at 1294-95.
143. According to critics of the "layered federalism" model, the ad hoc,
fragmented decision-making approach fostered by the model is the antithesis of
rational ecosystem decision-making Oliver A. Houck, Ending the War: A Strategy to Save
America's Coastal Zone, 47 MD. L. REV. 358, 361 (1988). See also Rychlak, supra note 136, at
944-99.
144. 16 U.S.C. § 1455(d)(4) (1994) (state must hold public hearings in
development of management plan).
145. ld. §1455(d)(14).
146. For a description of the dispute resolution mechanisms of the CZMA
showing both the formalism of those mechanisms as well as their effectiveness at
averting conflict and delay, see Beyle, supra note 25, at 212-16. For a contrary view of
the provision's conflict avoidance effectiveness, see Whitney et al., supra note 133.
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management irrationality and lack of community inclusivity afflicting public
lands management today as a result of the application of the "dominant
federal" model. The least curative approach, and thus the least appealing
substitute for the current paradigm, is that offered by the "dual regulation"
model. Experience with the first model reveals that its theoretical promises
are largely chimerical.
The "collaborative management" and "layered federalism" models, on
the other hand, do offer some advancements over the "dominant federal"
model. Enhanced state roles under these models have led to a lessening of
federal tensions as well as a greater opportunity for rational ecosystem
management and more inclusive decision-making. At the same time,
application of these more cooperative models of governance may make
more problematic the achievement of national norms and, at least with
regard to the "layered federalism" model, the avoidance of distributional
inequities. Therefore, none of these models warrants wholesale relocation to
public domain lands without careful weighing of what is gained and lost in
the substitution process.
-If changes to the current public lands governance model are going to
be made, however, it may be more important to resolve the ecosystem
management and public participation problems of the "dominant federal"
model than its federalism tensions. Friction in our federal system of
government has been in existence since the formation of the republic. The
mere fact that these tensions exist at all on public lands, where there is no
institutional role for either state or local governments, is a testament to the
endemic and persistent nature of the problem under our system of
government. Examination of the three federalism models shows, at most, a
lessening of these tensions, but not their complete disappearance. To hope
for more, in the case of public domain lands, therefore, may be to hope for
too much.
The same cannot be said, however, with respect to overcoming the
political and institutional barriers preventing rational ecosystem
management and democratic decision-making on public domain lands.
Unless these problems can be solved, the biological and social communities
that depend upon those lands will wither and die. Therefore, features of the
three models examined in this article that remove these barriers should be
looked at seriously in the redesign process, even if the models' other
attributes are not so promising.
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